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PINNING GUILT ON PINOCHET
Alfred P. Rubin*
Britain's Highest Court has decided that a treaty requires the British to
honor a Spanish request for the extradition of General Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte, Chile's strong man from 1973 until he "retired" with a rank of "Senator
for Life" in Chile. The decision has raised the hopes of many that Pinochet
would finally be made to face the moral evils that many think justify criminal
punishment. Less noticed, it has aroused the apprehension of those concerned
with the structure of international society and the place of "law" in it.
Assuming that Pinochet is in fact responsible for the evils his government has
been accused of, I am reminded of Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons,'
in which St. Thomas More refuses to cut a road through the law to catch a
wicked person:
And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you
- where would you hide...? This country's planted thick with laws
.. , man's laws, not God's - and if you cut them down... d'you
really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's
sake.'
The first rule of law is its distribution of authority; Constitutional Law.
No matter how wicked a person, before he or she can be tried, a court must be
found with jurisdiction over the person and the offense. Since Spanish criminal
law does not apply to events in Chile any more than it applies to events in the
United States, the first question is whether Spain has the necessary jurisdiction
to apply to Pinochet its version of "international criminal law." There are many
reasons why it does not. Spanish judges given authority in a Spanish legal
order do not represent the international legal community; they represent the
Spanish legal community. If under the law of Spain they can apply the Spanish
version of "international criminal law" to the acts of a Chilean, Pinochet, in
Chile, that remains an authority derived from Spanish constitutional law, not
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from international law. Secondly, under the unwritten constitution of inter-
national society, derived from history, practice, and political necessity, like the
unwritten British Constitution, all states are equal. If Spain can try Pinochet for
violations of the Spanish version of international criminal law, then Iran can try
Salman Rushdie under the Iranian version of international criminal law. Nor
does the oft-mentioned example of piracy stand close inspection; the opinions
of publicists and even dicta in tribunals does not make a convincing precedent,
and the reasons why no country arrests or tries a foreign pirate who has attacked
only third country shipping are clear. Would the United States accept the
authority of Haiti or Cuba to rule the waves in that way? In main-stream
international law texts jurisdiction is divided into segments. Even if a state has
"jurisdiction to prescribe," that is the authority to make illegal by its own
version of international law some acts by foreigners in so-called "universal
jurisdiction" cases, it does not necessarily have "jurisdiction to enforce." It is
the lack of that "jurisdiction to enforce" that makes it necessary for Spain to
request cooperation, extradition, from the United Kingdom. Even if Pinochet
is extradited, thus placing him within Spain's territorial "jurisdiction to
enforce," that does not mean that Spain has "jurisdiction to adjudicate" in a
criminal matter. I know of no case in which a war criminal or other supposed
violator of "international criminal law" from a major power has ever been tried
by a neutral tribunal.
The precedents in law all go the other way and have nothing to do with
"chief of state" immunity. States in general do not interfere in the internal
affairs of their neighbors but, except for spies, allow total personal immunity
for any agent of state acting in a public capacity even if acting abroad. For
example, France recently argued that the French agents involved in sinking the
Greenpeace in New Zealand, because they acted for France, should be relieved
of their liability under New Zealand's criminal law, even though the French
actions were illegal as a matter of international law and their agents acted
criminally under New Zealand's criminal law. Eventually, the convicted French
agents were released to France as the result of the intermediacy of the United
Nations Secretary General.
If there was a rule of international constitutional law under which Pinochet
could be tried in Spain for his official actions, that rule could not apply equally
among the sovereigns of the world who are supposedly equal before the law.
Not only does the Salman Rushdie example indicate the problems, but, even
more obviously, it would be politically disastrous to the cause of peace and
reconciliation for a neutral state to attempt to indict Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon,
various Russian and Chechen leaders, Margaret Thatcher, Gerry Adams,
Milosevic, Izetbegovic, Tudjman - but the list is endless. However desirable
it might seem, without forbidding revolutions by international law and placing
international "guardians" over even democratically elected governments, it is
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currently impossible to put the world into the hands of people who would agree
that various particular atrocities could never be justified in the interest of
stability, order, security of person, and property. When Plato made a similar
suggestion, he noted that those best fit to be the "guardians" of society would
not want the job.
What are the alternatives? For one, instead of a criminal action in Spain
under the Spanish version of international criminal law, what about a normal
civil suit against Pinochet in the United Kingdom (or anywhere else Pinochet
is physically present or has assets) for the damage he has inflicted on anybody?
Such suits are not uncommon. They are resolved by national courts referring
to an applicable system of law, which might be the law of Chile, under which
Pinochet has immunities, but might be international claims law. It depends on
the "choice of law" rule of the tribunal; a thing to be investigated by plaintiffs'
attorneys and argued before a tribunal that has "jurisdiction to enforce" over the
defendant and "jurisdiction to adjudicate" in the particular case. This
difference between civil and criminal causes was illustrated in the United States
most notably in the O.J. Simpson affair; he was acquitted in a criminal trial and
convicted in a civil action. Another possibility is an ordinary international
claim by Spain against Chile for the "denial of justice" to Pinochet's Spanish
victims. Again, the procedures are well-precedented and do not involve the
complexities of proving the rules of a supposed international criminal law., A
third possibility is the "Waldheim" solution: Kurt Waldheim was never tried
by anybody and it is still not known if he committed any war crimes, but he
cannot get a visa to visit any place outside of Austria. Pinochet, like other
persons of dubious moral standing, but undoubted pride and political
significance back "home," can be restricted to his home turf by governments
that agree that his past actions fall below their moral standards. Had the British
taken this view, Pinochet would not have been given a visa, could not have
visited England, and there would have been no extradition request or Pinochet
case in the United Kingdom.
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